Research

Working papers

Confidence and Organizations (new version coming soon!)

In many environments, professionals have miscalibrated beliefs about their skills and knowledge, which potentially compromises the quality of their work. Why might a firm be better off hiring an individual known to be over- or under-confident? In this paper, I argue that such biases can alleviate agency frictions. I present a model in which an agent uses his private information to make a choice on behalf of a principal. Players differ in their preferred action in a given state of the world. In this setting, I consider what I call the belief design problem: how would the principal optimally like the agent to interpret his private information? I provide conditions under which the solution to this problem can be interpreted as the principal preferring a rational, an under-confident, or an over-confident agent. Rationality is strictly preferred by the principal if and only if the expected difference in the players' preferred actions does not vary with the signal.

Work in progress

Robust contracts under social preferences

Research careers

Teaching

University of Bonn

Topics in Microeconomic Theory (M.Sc.) - Lecturer

Behavioral Economics (M.Sc.) - Lecturer

Northwestern University

Business Analytics I, II (MBA) - Teaching Assistant

Public Economics (MBA) - Teaching Assistant

Ethics and Leadership (MBA/Executive MBA) - Teaching Assistant

Universidad del Rosario

Microeconomics I (B.Sc.) - Lecturer

Mathematical Economics (B.Sc.) - Lecturer

Mathematical Economics (M.Sc./Ph.D.) - Teaching Assistant

Education

Ph.D., Managerial Economics & Strategy - Kellogg School of Management - Northwestern University (Evanston - USA, 2022)

Chairs: David Besanko and Luis Rayo

M.Sc., Managerial Economics & Strategy - Kellogg School of Management - Northwestern University (Evanston - USA, 2017)

M.Sc., Economics (with distinction) - London School of Economics (London - UK, 2015)

B.Sc., Finance - Universidad del Rosario (Bogota - Colombia, 2012)